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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Carolyn Dixon, a thirty-five year old wife and mother of three, fought in court to 
gain access to her adoption records1 which had been sealed under a Michigan law 
mandating the sealing of all adoption records in that state.2 Ms. Dixon testified that 
her inability to find out the identities of her birth parents had given rise to a severe 
depression lasting several years.3  Her psychiatrist testified that Ms. Dixon had been 
emotionally deprived as a child, which led to a series of suicide attempts and 
hospitalizations.4 In addition, her inability to find the identities of her birth parents 
compromised her recovery from depression and her ability to “establish a secure 
psychological base.”5  Her psychiatrist also noted that experience had shown him 
                                                                
1References to “original birth and adoption records” will be made throughout this Note.  In 
his book, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE, Arthur D. Sorosky explains, as a general matter, what is 
meant by an original birth record and what is meant by an adoption record.  “Generally,” he 
explains, “[adoption records] contain a great deal of pertinent medical, legal, personal, and 
family information, including identifying information.  After the adoption has been legalized 
by court action, [the adoption] record is sealed . . . .”  ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE 
ADOPTION TRIANGLE 19 n.* (1978).  An original birth certificate, on the other hand, is “the 
birth certificate issued within the first few days after the child’s birth, which includes 
information regarding the birth father and mother.”  Id.  Sorosky goes on to explain what 
happens to the original birth certificate while the adoption proceedings are pending and after 
the adoption is finalized; he writes: 
The child, although legally relinquished and placed for adoption, retains his/her true 
identity until the judge, in court, legalizes the adoption, issues an adoption decree, and 
orders a new, amended birth certificate, registering the child under his/her adoptive 
parents’ names.  At that time, the original birth certificate is removed from the local 
and state files, sealed, and refilled elsewhere. 
Id.  In doing research for this Note, the author spoke to an adult adoptee about amended birth 
certificates and saw an actual amended birth certificate.  The amended birth certificate looked 
exactly like a “normal” birth certificate; however, instead of listing the birth parents’ names in 
the spots reserved for “Mother” and “Father,” the amended birth certificate listed the adoptive 
parents’ names in those spots.  The adult adoptee with whom the author spoke regarding this 
topic had been successful in accessing her original birth certificate, and she showed the author 
her two birth certificates (the original one and the amended one) side by side. The author 
could not help but think that the often-used legal term of art “legal fiction” is an accurate 
descriptor for amended birth certificates. 
2Dixon v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 323 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Id.  A suggested reason for the connection between Ms. Dixon’s emotional troubles and 
the need to allow adult adoptees access to original birth and adoption records will be made in 
Part II.A:  Why Adult Adoptees Seek Access to Their Original Birth and Adoption Records. 
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“there is generally a deep-seated need on the part of adoptees to know their 
biological origins, regardless of the quality of family life in their adopted families.”6   
Ultimately, citing a lack of good cause, the court rejected Ms. Dixon’s petition for 
access to her adoption records.7  The court held that Ms. Dixon’s curiosity regarding 
her biological birth parents’ identities was greater than her actual psychological need 
to know, and thus, she could not establish the good cause necessary for the release of 
the records.8   
Sadly, adult adoptees in America must confront the reality that, in most states,9 
their right to access their original birth and adoption records is a very narrow right 
statutorily granted only to those who can show good cause.10  A general desire to 
know one’s biological parents or ancestral origins is not generally accepted as 
sufficient to support a petition for access.11  In his book, Adam Pertman12 highlights 
the absurdity of such narrow access statutes and asserts that adult adoptees’ general 
                                                                
6Id.  Several studies have shown that an adoptee’s search for his biological origins is a 
normal and natural exercise.  For a discussion of these studies see, for example, Elizabeth J. 
Samuels, The Idea of Adoption:  An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth 
Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367 (2001). 
7Dixon, 323 N.W. 2d at 553.  
8Id. at 552-53. 
9Part II.B sets forth a list of states that allow adult adoptee access to original birth and 
adoption records.  As will be shown, this is a very short (only six states) list, and it is this list 
that adult adoptee activists seek to expand.   
10Courts generally find that good cause is shown only by a plaintiff with a severe physical 
or psychological condition or a suspicion of a severe physical or psychological condition.  In 
Iowa, for example, a court rejected an adult adoptee’s request for access to his sealed adoption 
records on the basis of an Iowa statute mandating a showing of good cause defined as that 
which is “necessary to save the life of or prevent irreparable physical or mental harm to an 
adopted person or the person’s offspring.”  In re the Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d 794, 801 
(Iowa 2002).   Compare In re the Application of Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981) (finding 
that the plaintiff’s suspicion that she was a “DES Baby,” supported by her physician’s same 
suspicion, constituted good cause; and if she proved the merits of her suspicion in a court 
hearing, she would be entitled to the release of her adoption records), with In re Philip S., 881 
A.2d 931 (R.I. 2005) (rejecting an adult adoptee’s request for access to his adoption records 
because the adoptee’s religious convictions did not constitute good cause in Rhode Island.)  In 
In re Philip S., the court wrote,  
Speaking in general terms, it is our view that only a truly extraordinary claim 
can constitute good cause sufficient to trump the confidentiality and privacy rights of 
the other parties to the adoption triangle.  While we are not without sympathy for 
those who seek to learn about their ‘roots,’ we must not allow the good cause 
requirement to become a nullity. 
Id. at 935 n.8. 
11See Dixon, 323 N.W.2d at 552. 
12Because of his extensive research and writing on the topic of adoption, Mr. Pertman is 
cited as a leading expert in adoption issues.  Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute About 
Staff Page, http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/about/apertman.php (last visited March 27, 
2007).  He worked as a reporter and editor for The Boston Globe for over twenty years and 
now serves as the Executive Director of the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute.  Id.     
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desire to know should be recognized as a sufficient basis for access.13  He writes, 
“The desire to know about and connect with one’s genetic ancestry has long been 
accepted as a normal instinct, perhaps even a basic component of human nature . . . .  
[I]t’s why drawing family trees has been a routine teaching technique for as long as 
anyone can remember . . . .”14  While the rest of American citizens take unfettered 
access to their birth records for granted, most adoptees are statutorily blocked from 
such access and, thus, “marked as lesser citizens entitled to fewer rights.”15 
Restricted access to original birth and adoption records affects adult adoptees in 
ways beyond treatment as marginalized citizens; adult adoptees often face great 
psychological obstacles because restricted access to original birth and adoption 
records hinders the adoptee’s search for identity.  Pertman has remarked that there is 
a general consensus that “adoptees receive psychological treatment at higher rates 
than the population at large.”16  He continues, “This disparity presumably stems 
largely from the tumult of having to deal with complex emotions and tough identity 
questions.”17  These contentions are supported by the work of other researchers who 
have found that “adolescent and adult adoptees are more vulnerable to the 
development of identity conflicts than their nonadopted counterparts.”18   
                                                                
13ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION:  HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA (2000). 
14Id. at 32-33.  In his very passionate argument that adult adoptees should be able to access 
their original birth and adoption records, Pertman makes two very powerful points; he writes:   
[T]he current genealogy craze in this country is being characterized on television, in 
books and magazines, and especially on the World Wide Web, as a fun hobby and a 
fulfilling activity for people of all ages.   
Except for adoptees. . . . [J]udges continue to treat adults . . . as if they are 
children.  Some even demand adoptive parents’ consent in requests for identifying 
documents, regardless of the applicant’s age, as if the adoptees were asking for 
something other than information that scam artists, murdrerers, and everybody else in 
the United States can obtain as a birth right. 
Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
15Id. at 80. 
16Id. at 85.  A study looking at coping mechanisms in adopted persons also cited higher 
rates of receipt of psychological treatment in adoptees than in nonadoptees and tied the need 
for this treatment to the adoptees’ identity issues.  Daniel W. Smith & David M. Brodzinsky, 
Coping With Birthparent Loss in Adopted Children, 43:2 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & 
PSYCHIATRY 213, 213 (2002).  Smith and Brodzinsky write: 
[A]doptees as a group are at somewhat greater risk for maladjustment than their non-
adopted peers.  For example, adoptees are over-represented in outpatient and inpatient 
clinical settings and, regardless of clinical status, exhibit more academic problems and 
externalizing behavior problems, such as aggressiveness, oppositional behavior, 
impulsivity, hyperactivity, and running-away, than non-adoptees . . . .  
. . . At the core of this [understanding of adoptee behavior] is the assumption 
that adoption is inherently associated with a variety of loss-related experiences.  For 
example, adoptees experience the loss of birthparents and extended birth family; loss 
of status; loss of ethnic, racial, and genealogical connections; . . . and loss of identity. 
Id.  (citations omitted).   
17PERTMAN, supra note 13, at 85.   
18SOROSKY, supra note 1, at 13.  
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If adopted persons are more likely to face identity issues,19 and thus, are more 
likely in need of psychological treatment, it would make sense that a mechanism that 
might ease some of these identity issues, such as the ability to access information 
directly related to one’s identity (information in an original birth certificate, for 
example), would result in greater mental health for adoptees.  Improved mental 
health for any sector of society should be an important governmental interest; 
improved mental health for a sector such as adoptees, whose numbers are so great 
that 60% of Americans report having a direct connection to adoption,20 should be 
considered a very important governmental interest.21  
There are myriad reasons why courts have upheld the statutory bars to adult 
adoptee access to birth and adoption records.  Courts have said these statutes do not 
violate: the adoptee’s right to due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,22 the adoptee’s right to privacy,23 the adoptee’s property rights,24 or the 
                                                                
19See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.  See also infra Part II.A:  Why Adult 
Adoptees Seek Access to Their Original Birth and Adoption Records. 
20E. Wayne Carp, Introduction, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA:  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 
(E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002).  Carp remarks:  
Adoption touches almost every conceivable aspect of American society and culture.  
Adoption commands our attention because of the enormous number of people who 
have a direct, intimate connection to it – some experts put the number as high as six 
out of every ten Americans. . . . In short, adoption is a ubiquitous social institution in 
American society, creating invisible relationships with biological and adoptive kin that 
touch far more people than we imagine.   
Id.  It is difficult to identify exactly how many adopted persons there are in this country or 
how many adoptions take place each year because there is no central database into which these 
numbers are compiled.  Kathy P. Zamostny et al., The Practice of Adoption:  History, Trends, 
and Social Context, 31 THE COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 657 (Nov. 2003).  Zamostny 
reports that “there are no consistent and comprehensive data-keeping procedures on U.S. 
adoption . . .”  Id.  Recent estimates on the number of adopted persons in the U.S. range from 
one to five million.  Id. at 658.   
21Improving the mental health of adult adoptees by opening up access to original birth and 
adoption records and the mental health of birth parents should not be viewed as mutually 
exclusive.  Clinical research into the effect of relinquishment (putting a child up for adoption) 
on birth mothers has shown that birth mothers tend to feel “a powerful sense of loss and 
isolation.”  Mary O’Leary Wiley & Amanda L. Baden, Birth Parents in Adoption:  Research, 
Practice, and Counseling Psychology, 33 THE COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST  13, 26 (Jan. 2005) 
(Wiley is a psychologist in independent practice and Baden is a psychologist at Montclair 
State University).  This sense of loss is real; it is not simply a social construct that has been 
projected onto birth parents.  Id. at 42.  Making adoptions more open, however, can alleviate 
some of this sense of loss.  Id.  As Wiley and Baden report:  
[B]irth parents experience a loss that is nearly unparalleled in society.  When this loss 
is shrouded in secrecy, the feelings of shame, stigmatization, and marginalization are 
increased.  The movement toward the spirit of openness in adoption as well as the 
actual level of openness between adoptees, adoptive families, and birth families holds 
promise for birth parents’ experience of relinquishment and adoption. 
Id.  Thus, as a part of making adoptions more open, the unsealing of original birth and 
adoption records could serve to alleviate the mental anguish not only of adoptees, but also 
birth parents. 
22See, e.g., Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
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adoptee’s right to receive information and ideas.25  One of the most widely used 
arguments, however, is that allowing adult adoptees access to original birth and 
adoption records would violate birth parents’ right to privacy.26   
Courts should not base bars to adult adoptees’ access to their original birth and 
adoption records on birth parents’ right to privacy.  Birth parent privacy claims in the 
adult adoptee context fail because open access systems threaten neither birth parent 
rights to make important decisions regarding fundamental rights free from 
government intrusion nor birth parent rights to prevent the excessive and 
unnecessary dissemination of personal information.  In short, adult adoptee access to 
original birth and adoption records does not jeopardize the constitutional privacy 
rights of birth parents.  Thus, the right to constitutional privacy must be read more 
narrowly in adult adoptee access cases, and all state courts and legislatures should 
espouse an open access system27 that would allow adult adoptees to access their 
original birth and adoption records.  
Part II of this paper will explore the reasons why adult adoptees search for 
information regarding their biological origins and the history of adult adoptees’ 
access to original birth and adoption records.  Part III will give a brief overview of 
the concept of constitutional privacy and discuss the several categories of privacy 
currently recognized in American law and the relationship between privacy and open 
access statutes.  Part IV will assert that birth parent privacy interests are an 
insufficient basis for blocking adult adoptee access to original birth and adoption 
records.  Part V explores some recent judicial and legislative approaches supporting 
and expanding upon the arguments made in Part IV.  Finally, Part VI will briefly 
discuss one state’s mitigation of the possible negative effects of open access systems 
and suggest that these measures might be a fair way to balance the interests of birth 
parents and adult adoptees.  In the end, it is quite clear that legislatures and courts 
should not rely on birth parent privacy assertions in their examination of the validity 
of open access statutes.  Instead, these governmental bodies should espouse open 
access statutes as a means to a more equal and healthy society. 
II.  WHY ADULT ADOPTEES SEARCH FOR INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THEIR 
ADOPTIONS AND THE HISTORY OF ADULT ADOPTEES’ ACCESS TO ORIGINAL BIRTH 
AND ADOPTION RECORDS 
A.  Why Adult Adoptees Seek Access to Their Original Birth and Adoption Records 
There is a general consensus that adult adoptees seek access to their original birth 
and adoption records primarily as a healthy means of gaining a better understanding 
                                                          
23See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E. 2d 751, 754 (Ill. 1981). 
24See Aimone v. Finley, 447 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
25See, e.g., Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754-57. 
26Several cases illustrating this statement will be discussed in Part III:  THE CONCEPT OF 
PRIVACY IN AMERICA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OPEN ACCESS STATUTES. 
27Throughout this Note the author will be advocating for an “open access system.”  By 
“open access system,” the author simply means a system in which adult adoptees  have access 
to all their original birth and adoption records, just as non-adopted persons have access to their 
birth records. 
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of their own personal identities and existence.  Arthur Sorosky, a psychiatrist, 
researcher, and author of the widely cited book, The Adoption Triangle, explains that 
three separate forces form identity concurrently: the psychobiological force, the 
psychosocial force, and the psychohistorical force.28  The author further explains that 
“[t]he psychohistorical dimension includes that part of man’s identity that relates to 
his/her sense of genealogy . . . .”29  Because most adoptees are prohibited from 
gaining information about their birth parents and the circumstances surrounding their 
births, they often lack the psychohistorical dimension of identity creation, and this 
contributes to the need for adult adoptees to seek out their origins through searches 
for their original birth and adoption records and ultimately, their birth parents.30  
Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton has asserted, “The quest itself and the curiosity I 
would in no way see as some sort of compensatory behavior or as an expression of 
disturbance; I would see it as healthy and necessary.”31 
A study conducted by a licensed professional clinical counselor and a professor 
of counseling finds that adult adoptees seek access to original birth information and 
birth parents out of an existential need to find authenticity and truth in one’s 
existence.32  The authors of this study assert that an adoptee’s search for information 
regarding her origins is central to achieving greater mental health.33  The authors 
write, “For the adopted individual, the uncovering of his or her own truth begins with 
the awareness of the desire to search . . . for his or her biological beginnings.”34 
Finally, Karen March of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at 
Carleton University asserts that adoptees who seek out information pertaining to 
their birth and adoptions are actually in search of social acceptance.35  In her studies, 
March found that many adult adoptees sensed that people treated them differently 
once they found out about the adoptee’s adopted status, and that society placed a 
                                                                
28SOROSKY, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
29Id. at 14. 
30Id.  Sorosky writes, “We believe that the adoptee, ignorant of his/her true background, 
despite a healthy, nurturing relationship with his/her adoptive parents and a lack of severe 
problems in his/her relationships with peers and others, will be handicapped in the 
psychohistorical dimension of identity.” Id.   
31Id. at 138.   
32Mary J. Jago Krueger & Fred J. Hanna, Why Adoptees Search:  An Existential Treatment 
Perspective, 75 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 195, 195 (Jan./Feb. 1997).  The authors explain that 
“[e]xistentialism deals with primary, inescapable, and transcultural . . . aspects of human 
existence.  It is concerned with an individual’s struggle to come to terms with one’s being-in-
the-world.  It deals with the authenticity of one’s existence . . . and the desire to attain 
meaningfulness and one’s intrinsic freedom.”  Id. at 197 (citations omitted).  At the time of the 
writing of their study, Ms. Krueger was a licensed clinical professional counselor and a 
doctoral candidate in educational psychology; Mr. Hanna was a professor at Johns Hopkins 
University.  Id. at 195.   
33Id. at 195-96. 
34Id. at 197 (citation omitted).  
35Karen March, Perception of Adoption as Social Stigma:  Motivation for Search and 
Reunion, 57 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 653, 654 (Aug. 1995). 
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stigma on adoptive families as “different.”36  The subjects of March’s research 
reported that they felt social stigmatization the most when asked questions about 
their origins that they were unable to answer because they lacked access to the 
information (and to persons who held information) regarding the circumstances of 
their births; this stigmatization came from the adoptees’ perceptions that people 
made negative assumptions about the circumstances of the adoptees’ births.37  
Adoptees are able to gain social acceptance, March argues, when they are able to 
find the answers to questions about their biological backgrounds.38  This social 
acceptance is gained because, as March writes, “by removing the constraints of 
secrecy, [adoptees] have gained more power over their presentation of self and over 
negative assumptions that others might make about their biological history and the 
reasons for their adoption.”39 
Whether adult adoptees seek access to their original birth and adoption records as 
a means to gaining a better understanding of their identities, as a natural reaction to 
an existential need for truth about their origins, or as a means to gaining social 
acceptance, there is clearly a need for adult adoptees to have access to their original 
birth and adoption records.  Access to such information—information that includes 
relevant facts surrounding a person’s birth and biological relationships—replaces 
secrets with facts and closes the gaps in one’s biographical story.  Unfortunately, as 
the history of open access statutes shows,40 adoptees face difficulty in gaining such 
access.   
B.  A Historical Overview of Open Access Statutes 
The confidentiality and secrecy between parties to an adoption exhibited in 
today’s society is not indicative of the way things have always been.  Adoption is a 
statutory creation dating back to 1851 when Massachusetts passed its Adoption 
Act.41  The Act allowed both the parties to the adoption (the birth parents, the 
adopted child, and the adoptive parents) and the general public access to the adoption 
                                                                
36Id. at 656. 
37Id.  One of March’s study subjects reported:  
When someone is told that you are adopted, they usually start to ask you questions 
about your birth mother.  Those questions generally have an underlying implication 
that she was a loose person.  Like, sitting in the back of a cab with some guy or 
something.  You carry that image.  Because you don’t have the information to deny it.  
It makes you wonder where you came from. 
Id.   
38Id. at 658. 
39Id.   
40See infra Part II.B:  A Historical Overview of Open Access Statutes. 
41Caroline B. Fleming, The Open-Records Debate:  Balancing the Interests of Birth 
Parents and Adult Adoptees, 11 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 461, 463 (2005).  The 
Massachusetts Adoption Act was “the first formal adoption statute . . . [it] standardized the 
adoption procedure . . . [and] required judicial confirmation of the adoptive parents’ fitness to 
raise the adoptee.”  Id. 
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records.42  This type of openness is demonstrative of the openness most state statutes 
displayed regarding adoption records until the early to middle twentieth century.43   
In 1917, Minnesota passed the first statute sealing adoption records, but the 
statute prohibited access only to the general public, not the involved parties such as 
the birth and adoptive parents or the adoptees.44 Beginning in the 1930s and 
continuing through to the 1980s, states started statutorily prohibiting adoptees from 
having unrestricted access to their original birth records.45  Scholars have offered 
differing opinions as to why such a shift from an open to a closed system of birth and 
adoption records occurred.46  Caroline Fleming47 suggests that, in the post World 
War II years, America favored traditional ideas of family and children (parents 
raising their own biological children), and a closed records system protected children 
from “the stigma of illegitimacy” created in such a society.48  Professor of Law 
Elizabeth J. Samuels49 argues that while the earliest advocates for sealing records did 
not intend for adult adoptees to be prohibited from accessing their birth records (the 
original intent was to protect the adoptive family from birth parent interference), a 
“regime of secrecy” resulted nonetheless and perpetuated the notion that such 
secrecy was necessary to prevent adoptees from exhibiting the abnormal desire to 
identify their biological parents.50  In summation, as the Chair of the History 
                                                                
42Id. 
43Samuels, supra note 6, at 368 (noting, “adoption procedures initially established by state 
statutes provided neither for confidentiality with respect to the public nor for secrecy among 
the parties . . . .”). 
44Fleming, supra note 41, at 464. 
45Samuels, supra note 6, at 369-70.  Samuels remarks that in 1960, 60% of states 
prohibited adult adoptees from having unrestricted access to their birth certificates. Id. at 369.  
By the end of the 1980’s, forty-seven states had passed statutes sealing adoption records and 
prohibiting unrestricted access to adult adoptees.  Id.  States also began mandating the issuing 
of amended birth certificates to adoptees; these birth certificates listed the adoptive parents as 
the parents of record and were used to shield adopted children from the stigma of the 
circumstances of their birth, i.e. illegitimacy.  Fleming, supra note 41, at 464-65.  According 
to Fleming, 35 states had amended birth certificate statutes by 1941.  Id. 
46See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
47Ms. Fleming made these observations while a Juris Doctor candidate at the College of 
William and Mary.  Fleming, supra note 41. 
48Id. at 465.  See also SOROSKY, supra note 1, at 37.  Sorosky and his fellow authors, in 
studying the reasons behind adoption record sealings, found that “the clear focus was upon the 
adoptee, who, [adoption experts] argued, should not be held responsible for the sins of the 
birth parent.”  Id.   
49Professor Samuels is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law.  She received her J.D. from the University of Chicago and is a graduate of 
Harvard College.  Samuels, supra note 6.   
50Samuels, supra note 6, at 370-71.  Samuels writes: 
[T]he regime of secrecy itself inevitably influenced social attitudes and 
understandings.  Actions once thought natural, such as attempts by adoptees to learn 
information about their birth families, came to be socially disfavored and considered 
abnormal. Such attempts acquired negative social meanings:  they were the 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
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Department at Pacific Lutheran University, E. Wayne Carp, definitively notes, 
“[S]ince World War II, the entire edifice of modern adoption has been enveloped in 
secrecy.”51   
Most states continue to operate under the closed system today. In fact, only six 
states allow adult adoptees unrestricted access to birth and adoption records, and 
thus, birth parent identifying information.52  The recent reasoning for a closed 
system, however, differs from the assertions given in the mid-twentieth century and 
outlined above.  In the latter twentieth century, legislatures, courts, and closed-
system advocates argued that a closed system is necessary, neither to protect the 
adoptee from the stigma of illegitimacy nor to protect the traditional notion of the 
family unit from the identity curiosities of an adoptee but to protect the privacy 
rights of the birth parent.53  Thus, the adoption statutes, once founded on the premise 
of protecting children from stigmas attached to adoption, are now legitimized as a 
means of protecting the privacy rights of birth parents.  This protection comes at the 
                                                          
psychologically unhealthful product of unsuccessful adoptions that had failed to create 
perfect substitutes for natural families created by childbirth, and they indicated 
adoptees’ rejection of and ingratitude toward adoptive parents.  Eventually, lifelong 
secrecy would be viewed as an essential feature of adoptions in which birth parents 
and adoptive parents did not know one another. 
Id.  
51Carp, supra note 20, at 2. 
52The six states currently allowing adult adoptees unrestricted access to their birth records, 
and thus, the ability to access identifying information about their birth records are:  Alabama, 
ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12(c) (LexisNexis 2006); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (2006); 
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-2122 (2006); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-
C:9(I) (LexisNexis 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 432.240 (2006); and Tennessee, TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2006).  In Tennessee, an adoptee may be subject to a contact veto, 
which would prohibit the adoptee from actually contacting his or her birth parent.  See Part VI 
for a more in-depth discussion of Tennessee’s contact veto provision.  For information on the 
status of each state’s adult adoptee access statutes, see The White Oak Foundation Map Page, 
http://www.whiteoakfoundation.org/mappage.htm (last visited July 15, 2007).  The White Oak 
Foundation Map Page is particularly useful because it identifies which states allow adult 
adoptees to access their original birth and adoption records, which states have contact or 
disclosure veto provisions, which states have intermediary or registry programs that are used 
to “match up” birth parents and adoptees who are seeking each other, which states have other 
kinds of limited access programs, and which states have no programs available to searching 
adoptees or birth parents.  Id.  For a state-by-state legislative report regarding adoption record 
access statutes, see The American Adoption Congress Legislative Page, 
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/legislation.htm (last visited July 15, 2007).  The 
American Adoption Congress Legislative Page is also particularly useful because it contains 
not only the most recent legislative report, but also legislative reports from years past (2004, 
2005, and 2006), so one can trace legislation as it makes its way from grassroots activities to 
votes in the statehouse. Id.  In addition, the American Adoption Congress homepage offers 
volumes of information surrounding open access system activism including suggested reading 
material for interested visitors and search guidance for adoptees seeking to learn more about 
their origins. See generally The American Adoption Congress Home Page, 
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/home.htm (last visited July 15, 2007).   
53See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981); In re Janice Assalone, 512 A.2d 
1383 (R.I. 1986).  These cases will be discussed later in this note; see infra notes 83-92 and 
accompanying text. 
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expense of adult adoptees who would simply like the opportunity to know more 
about their origins and identities.   
III.  THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OPEN ACCESS 
STATUTES 
A.  The Meaning and History of Privacy 
The above discussion begs the question:  what is the right to privacy?   The right 
to privacy was first recognized as a protected right by the Georgia Supreme Court in 
1905.54  Richard A. Glenn, a professor of government and political affairs and the 
author of The Right to Privacy:  Rights and Liberties under the Law explains, “Over 
the next fifty years, a majority of the states adopted a common law principle of an 
independent right to privacy.  Today, the right to privacy exists, in some form or 
another, in all fifty states.”55  The Supreme Court, in the 1965 landmark case of 
Griswold v. Connecticut, formally56 recognized that an independent constitutional 
right to privacy emanated from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments to the Constitution.57  Today, then, there are both state and federal 
constitutionally recognized rights to privacy.   
While there is no single definition of the right to privacy, many have been offered 
and debated.  In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Louis 
Brandeis said that the right to privacy, “as against the Government, [is] the right to 
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”58  There are two categories of privacy—tort privacy and 
                                                                
54RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:  RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 
11 (2003).  The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy in Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).  
55GLENN, supra note 54, at 12.  See also PRIVACY LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 22 
(Richard C. Turkington & Anita L. Allen eds., 2d ed. 2002).  Turkington and Allen write, 
“Explicit recognition of rights to privacy in our legal system did not occur before the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.  Privacy was protected prior to that time by legal norms which 
did not explicitly refer to privacy . . . .”  Id.   
56Although Griswold v. Connecticut is often cited as the first time the Supreme Court 
formally recognized the right to privacy, there were prior Supreme Court decisions that 
foreshadowed that the Supreme Court might recognize such a right.  See, e.g., Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (striking down a Nebraska law that outlawed the teaching 
of German and intimating that the 14th Amendment’s liberty provision, which seeks to protect 
rights “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men[,]” may necessarily give rise 
to privacy rights).  See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (striking down an 
Oregon law that forced parents to send their children to public schools because parents should 
have the liberty to control the upbringing of their children; this case again intimates the 
recognition of a privacy right surrounding important decisions). 
57Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a statute barring the use of 
contraceptives is an unconstitutional violation of the right of marital privacy).  The Supreme 
Court extended the right to use contraception to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972).   
58Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).   
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constitutional privacy59—and the concept of constitutional privacy has evolved into 
“the right of the individual to be free from unwanted and unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters affecting fundamental rights.”60  Today, conceptions of 
constitutional privacy not only include all that is discussed above, but also protecting 
individuals from the government’s acquisition and dissemination of personal 
information. 61  Thus, as the Supreme Court wrote in Whalen v. Roe, constitutional 
privacy involves two types of interests, “the interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters . . . and . . . the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”62  Both kinds of privacy interests are at stake in the context of 
adult adoptees gaining access to their original birth and adoption records.   
Privacy has long been valued by society as one of our most cherished and 
important rights.  Aside from the role of privacy in enabling people to keep certain 
things from undergoing public scrutiny, the right of privacy has also been credited 
with helping individuals realize a full and happy life.63  In fact, Raymond Wacks64 
highlights a study supporting this contention and asserting that four factors of 
privacy contribute integrally to the health of human existence.  He writes: 
First, [privacy] provides personal autonomy; the democratic principle of 
individuality is linked to the need for autonomy:  the desire to avoid being 
manipulated or dominated by others.  Secondly, “privacy” provides the 
opportunity for emotional release.  Thirdly, it permits self-evaluation:  the 
                                                                
59GLENN, supra note 54, at 5-6.  This Note is strictly investigating constitutional privacy, 
not tort privacy.  “Tort privacy,” as Glenn explains:  
permits those who are of the opinion that their privacy has been invaded or denied to 
request from a court of law an action for damages against the person or persons who 
have committed the wrong.  For well over a century, privacy law was considered to be 
one of the components within the larger category of tort law. 
Id. at 6.  This Note solely investigates the possibility of governmental intrusions (via open 
access statutes) into privacy, not intrusions by private citizens; thus, it concerns constitutional 
privacy. 
60Id. at 6.   
61See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
62429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).  
63RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 11 (1989).  Wacks 
writes, “[Privacy] is claimed to be important, for example, to the individual’s psychological 
health . . . creativity . . . ability to love . . . and social relationships . . . .”  Id.  Another scholar 
has written, “A central and guiding principle of western liberal democracies is that individuals, 
within certain limits, may set and pursue their own life goals and projects.  Rights to privacy 
erect a moral boundary that allows individuals the moral space to order their lives as they see 
fit.”  Adam Moore, Intangible Property:  Privacy, Power, and Information Control, in 
INFORMATION ETHICS:  PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND POWER 172, 183 (Adam Moore ed., 2005).  
Moore continues, “Privacy protects us from the prying eyes and ears of governments, 
corporations, and neighbors.  Within the walls of privacy we may experiment with new ways 
of living that may not be accepted by the majority.  Privacy, autonomy, and sovereignty, it 
would seem come bundled together.”  Id. at 184. 
64Wacks is a Professor of Law and Legal Theory at the University of Hong Kong.  Hong 
Kong University Press Author’s Profile Page, http://www.hkupress.org/asp/author_profile.asp 
?id=13 (last visited March 31, 2007). 
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creative and moral activities, and the formation and testing of ideas.  
Finally, it provides opportunities for sharing confidences and intimacies: 
limited and protected communication.65 
Because privacy is so valued by society, recent privacy trends have centered on 
giving individuals greater control over how and when their personal information is 
collected, disseminated, and used.66 
B.  Categories of Privacy Recognized Under American Law and the Relationship 
Between Privacy and Adoption 
In America today, there are six broad categories of privacy rights that are 
generally recognized:  reproductive/procreational privacy,67 familial privacy,68 
informational privacy,69 personal privacy,70 sexual privacy,71 and the right to die.72  
The right to privacy first expanded from its most basic form, the right “to be let 
                                                                
65WACKS, supra note 63, at 11-12. 
66Fred H. Cate, The Privacy Problem:  A Broader View of Information Privacy and the 
Costs and Consequences of Protecting It, 4 FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER PUBLICATION 5-6 
(March 2003).  William Safire echoed this sentiment in an essay in the New York Times when 
he wrote:  
Your bank account, your health record, your genetic code, your personal and shopping 
habits and sexual interests are your own business.  That information has a value.  If 
anybody wants to pay for an intimate look inside your life, let them make you an offer 
and you’ll think about it.  That’s opt in.  You may decide to trade the desired 
information about yourself for services like an E-mail box or stock quotes or other 
inducement.  But require them to ask you first. 
William Safire, Nosy Parker Lives, N.Y. TIMES, September 23, 1999, at A29. 
67See generally GLENN, supra note 54, at 66-117 (discussing the past and current state of 
reproductive autonomy rights in America).  See also Turkington & Allen, supra note 55, at 
757-839, for a collection of articles regarding reproductive privacy. 
68See generally id. at 839-868 (discussing privacy rights as they relate to marriage, 
divorce, and the rearing of children).  See also GLENN, supra note 54, at 117-32, 182-99 
(discussing the past and current state of familial autonomy rights in America). 
69See generally id. at 204-14 (discussing informational privacy rights in America).  See 
generally MADELINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY 199-769 (2003) 
(discussing access to and disclosure of personal information).  
70See generally GLENN, supra note 54, at 141-42 (discussing personal autonomy rights in 
America).  For purposes of this Note, the category of personal privacy will not be discussed 
because it has not been cited by courts as a basis for prohibiting adult adoptee access to birth 
and adoption records, and thus, birth parent identifying information.   
71See generally id at 132-40, 199-204 (discussing sexual autonomy rights in America). For 
purposes of this paper, the category of sexual privacy will not be discussed because it has not 
been cited by courts as a basis for prohibiting adult adoptee access to birth and adoption 
records, and thus, birth parent identifying information.   
72See generally SCHACHTER, supra note 69, at 889-994 (discussing rights surrounding the 
right to die in America).  For purposes of this paper, privacy rights regarding the right to die 
will not be discussed because it has not been cited by courts as a basis for prohibiting adult 
adoptee access to birth and adoption records, and thus, birth parent identifying information.  
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alone,” when the Supreme Court recognized that such a right was necessary in order 
for individuals to be able to exercise their reproductive and familial rights.73  
Reproductive privacy has now evolved to include matters such as sterilization,74 
contraception,75 pregnancy and childbirth,76 and abortion.77  Activities such as 
marriage,78 divorce,79 and childrearing80 have enjoyed constitutional protection under 
familial privacy because courts have generally been hesitant to encroach upon the 
family unit.81  Informational privacy is a more recently recognized category of 
privacy protecting the disclosure or dissemination of personal information.82 
Given these conceptions of privacy, courts have argued that sealing birth records 
is necessary to protect birth parent constitutional privacy.  In In re Roger B., an 
Illinois court rejected an adult adoptee’s claim that the state adoption record statute 
was unconstitutional because birth parents deserved to have the highly personal 
decision to place a child for adoption protected as a matter of privacy.83  The court 
                                                                
73Glenn, supra note 54, at 143. 
74See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding the Oklahoma Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act unconstitutional on equal protection grounds but the dicta of the 
opinion showed a recognition of reproductive privacy). 
75See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  In this landmark case, the 
Supreme Court held that a law forbidding a married couple from using contraception violates 
the right to marital privacy, which is grounded in the Bill of Rights.  Id.   
76See GLENN, supra note 54, at 82-83 (illustrating situations in which the state is not 
allowed to intrude upon a woman’s autonomy just because she is pregnant). 
77See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding an antiabortion law 
unconstitutional because the law intruded upon a woman’s constitutionally protected privacy 
right to decide to terminate a pregnancy).  After discussing the historical evolution of the 
constitutionally protected right to privacy and other areas of human activity that have been 
protected under the right to privacy, the Court wrote, “We, therefore, conclude that the right of 
personal privacy includes the abortion decision . . . .” Id. at 154.    
78See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that a Wisconsin law, which 
prohibited persons who were behind on their child support payments from marrying, was 
unconstitutional because it intruded upon a person’s fundamental right to decide whether to 
marry). 
79See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (holding that a state cannot deny a person 
the right to a divorce simply because the person is unable to pay the court fees related to 
divorce proceedings because it violates the person’s fundamental right to decide whether to 
dissolve his marriage).    
80See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510  (1925) (recognizing that parents and 
guardians have a fundamental protected right to direct the upbringing of their children).  In 
this case, Oregon passed a statute entitled the Compulsory Education Act, and it mandated that 
children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public school.  Id.  The court held that, 
while the state could reasonably mandate that all children must attend some school (whether 
public or private), a state could not interfere with a parent’s right to choose which school the 
child attended.  Id.  See also discussion infra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
81See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
82See infra text accompanying notes 138-47 for a discussion of informational privacy. 
83In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ill. 1981). 
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said that the statutes mandating the sealing of adoption records “represent a 
considered legislative judgment that confidentiality promotes the integrity of the 
adoption process.  Confidentiality is needed to protect the privacy of the natural 
parent.”84  The court went on to cite case law highlighting the court’s view that the 
natural parents, especially those who have moved on to have families of their own in 
later years, have the right to be let alone.85  Similarly, in In re Janice Assalone, the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejected an adult adoptee’s petition for disclosure of 
her adoption records because she failed to show good cause to the extent necessary 
to overcome the birth parents’ constitutionally protected privacy rights surrounding 
the decision to relinquish a child for adoption.86   
In Doe and Doe v. Ward Law Firm, the Supreme Court of South Carolina did 
allow the adoptive parents of a severely mentally and physically disabled adult 
adoptee to access the medical information in the adoptee’s adoption records.87  The 
court found that the adoptee’s severe mental health issues met the good cause 
standard for South Carolina and warranted the disclosure of the information.88  
Shielding the biological parents from any threat of disruption of their privacy 
interests, however, the court mandated that a court appointed intermediary should be 
the only person to physically access the file.89  The intermediary was directed to 
prepare a report for the court, and then the court would disseminate only non-
identifying information to the adoptee and his parents.90  The court implemented the 
intermediary mechanism to maintain the birth parent’s privacy by protecting her 
from possible dissemination of her personal information by the state to the adoptee 
and his adoptive family.91  In the words of the court, “The intermediary is considered 
                                                                
84Id. 
85Id.  The Roger B. court quotes In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978): 
[T]he state at the behest of those concerned undertook through the adoption process to 
sever the parental relationship, award custody and establish a new relationship of 
parent and child.  Much of the information coming into the court’s records during that 
process is for good reason treated as a confidence, offering a fresh start to the parties 
so that natural parents making this agonizing decision are assured the parent-child 
relationship will be completely severed, both legally and socially and may put behind 
the mistakes and misfortunes precipitating this fateful act.  They are assisted in this 
traumatic experience by the knowledge that the records may be compromised only on 
order of the court and that neither the child nor the adoptive parents may question why 
they consented to the adoption or circumstances of the abandonment or neglect.  If it 
were otherwise, the adopted child might reenter their lives with disastrous results.  
There must be finality for the natural parents and a new beginning; if there is a right of 
privacy not to be lightly infringed, it would seem to be theirs. 
Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754 (emphasis added, citation omitted).   
86In re Janice Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1986). 
87John Doe and Jane Doe v. Ward Law Firm, 579 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. 2003). 
88Id. at 306. 
89Id. at 307. 
90Id. 
91Id.  
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an officer of the court and is required to guard any information received as 
confidential.”92 
These cases illustrate the notion that courts hold birth parent constitutional 
privacy as the paramount concern in adoptee access cases.  Even where adult 
adoptees are able to show the requisite good cause, the courts seek to allow access 
only in ways that simultaneously protect birth parent privacy.  It is clear from these 
cases that courts have hinged the issue of open access statutes on a larger privacy 
rights debate.   
IV.  BIRTH PARENT PRIVACY INTERESTS ARE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR BLOCKING 
ADULT ADOPTEE ACCESS TO ORIGINAL BIRTH AND ADOPTION RECORDS 
If a case is to be made for adult adoptees’ unrestricted access to their original 
birth and adoption records, then it is quite clear that such a case must be able to 
overcome the birth parent privacy assertions that courts have recognized and 
supported as an impediment to open access statutes.93  The premise of constitutional 
privacy as it is described above94 provides a valuable framework for making the case 
against birth parent privacy assertions.   
Constitutional privacy has two prongs.  As the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe 
explained, first, it involves an individual’s freedom from governmental interference 
with fundamental rights such that the individual is able to make decisions 
surrounding important matters independently.95  Secondly, constitutional privacy 
includes an individual’s right to be free from the government’s gathering and 
disclosure of his or her personal information.96  
When examined against these two prongs, birth parent privacy assertions lack 
sufficient weight to be afforded the protection that they have enjoyed.  Privacy 
assertions made under the first prong, for example, do not work because open access 
statutes will not impede the exercise of fundamental rights and because adoption 
rights, as statutory creations, do not give rise to privacy protections only afforded to 
fundamental rights.97  Privacy assertions made under the second prong fail because 
open access statutes do not violate a birth parent’s right to informational privacy.  
For these overarching reasons, and for the supporting reasoning outlined below, birth 
parent privacy claims against open access statutes should not be given the legal 
weight that they have historically enjoyed, and adult adoptees should have 
unrestricted access to their original birth and adoption records.   
                                                                
92Id. 
93See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where the courts 
have used birth parent privacy as a basis for blocking adult adoptee access to their original 
birth and adoption records. 
94See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
95Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600. 
96Id.  
97For a discussion of how adoption statutes allowing adult adoptees access to original birth 
and adoption do not implicate fundamental rights and their associated privacy protections, see 
infra note 135.   
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A.  Open Access Statutes Do Not Impede Birth Parent Exercises of Fundamental 
Rights and Adoption Rights Do Not Give Rise to Privacy Protections 
1.  Reproductive Privacy 
Birth parents have made the claim that open access statutes violate the 
reproductive privacy of birth parents.  They base this claim on the possibility that the 
child, once he or she reaches the age of majority, could seek out his or her biological 
parent someday, and this possibility interferes with the birth parent’s decision of 
whether or not to have the child, and thus, the birth parent’s reproductive privacy.98  
This argument can be overcome.  In looking at the types of issues or important 
decisions affecting fundamental rights that have been afforded reproductive privacy 
protections, one can see that the courts have extended privacy protections to 
decisions or activities that are sure to have an immediate or nearly immediate impact 
on the decision maker such as sterilization and abortion.99  The whole idea that the 
possibility that a child might seek out his birth parent eighteen to twenty-one years 
after the birth parent has decided to put the child up for adoption interferes with a 
woman’s reproductive privacy seems quite speculative, and thus, not worthy of 
privacy protection.   
As stated above, modern reproductive privacy protections have been extended to 
activities such as sterilization, contraception, pregnancy and childbirth, and 
abortion.100 All these activities have one thing in common:  they all involve a 
person’s right to be free from governmental intrusion into decisions that will 
immediately and directly affect their reproductive liberties.  In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
for example, the Supreme Court reversed an Oklahoma statute which provided “for 
the sterilization of ‘habitual criminals.’”101  In his opinion, Justice Douglas said, “We 
are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.  
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race. . . . There is no redemption for whom the law touches. . . . He is forever 
deprived of a basic liberty.”102  Justice Douglas’s opinion intimates the idea that once 
a person has been sterilized, he is immediately (and permanently) deprived of his 
freedom to exercise his reproductive rights; by its very nature, government-
sanctioned sterilization necessarily interferes with a person’s future reproductive 
choices.   
Similarly, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court asserted several immediate and 
direct consequences that could ensue if the right to privacy did not encompass a 
woman’s right to an abortion.103  The Court wrote,  
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by 
denying this choice altogether is apparent.  Specific and direct harm 
                                                                
98See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). 
99See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.  
100See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.   
101Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
102Id. at 541. 
103Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.  
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with an unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be 
involved.104 
The Court acknowledged that if it denied a woman the right to have an abortion, that 
denial could manifest directly and immediately in the circumstances listed above.105  
Thus, the Court extended the right to privacy to a woman’s decision of whether to 
have an abortion because interference with the right to an abortion necessarily affects 
a woman’s reproductive choices.106 
In the case of open access statutes for adult adoptees, however, there is minimal 
risk of governmental interference with the important decision making of the birth 
parents, and thus, there is no need for an extension of birth parent privacy rights.  
Open access statutes do not have a direct and immediate effect on birth parent 
reproductive decision making.  It is simply too speculative to argue that the 
possibility that an adult adoptee might seek out a birth parent eighteen to twenty-one 
years after the birth parent has conceived or given birth to the child would have a 
significant effect on a birth parent’s reproductive decision making.   
Furthermore, even if one argues that any interference in the reproductive 
decision-making progress is unacceptable, reproductive privacy case law illustrates 
that it is within government’s authority to promote policies that interfere, to some 
extent, with reproductive privacy rights.  For example, in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court upheld three restrictions on 
a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.107  The Court said that the state could 
exercise a policy of promoting life over abortion by mandating that, before a woman 
could get an abortion, she would have to be educated on the procedure, give 
informed consent, wait twenty-four hours between the time of consent and the 
procedure, and minor females would have to get parental consent.108  The Court 
approved these restrictions on abortion because, while they interfered to some extent 
with the decision to terminate a pregnancy, they did not place an undue burden on 
the woman’s right to have an abortion.109  If mandating that a woman must be 
educated on the consequences of her decision to have an abortion and a twenty-four 
hour waiting period do not constitute an undue burden on reproductive privacy 
rights, then, surely, the mere possibility that an adult adoptee might seek out his or 
                                                                
104Id. 
105Id.  
106Id. 
107505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
108Id. at 881-87, 899-900.  The parental consent restriction did allow for a medical 
emergency exception and a judicial bypass.  Id. at 899. 
109Id. at 881-87, 899-900. 
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her birth parents eighteen years in the future does not constitute something that will 
unacceptably burden reproductive privacy rights. 
Allowing adult adoptees access to their original birth and adoption records does 
not directly and immediately interfere with birth parents’ reproductive privacy rights, 
nor does it unreasonably burden birth parents’ procreational decisions.  Reproductive 
privacy assertions are better made against governmental intrusions that have a more 
immediate and direct effect on birth-parent decisions than governmental intrusions 
that may not even ever manifest in an effect on the birth parent.     
2.  Familial Privacy 
Birth parents have also attacked open access statutes on the grounds that the 
statutes infringe on birth parent rights to familial autonomy and the right to be free 
from familial disruption.110  These claims can be overcome on two grounds.  First, in 
examining familial privacy protections from a legal-historical perspective, it is clear 
that the kind of familial privacy assertions birth parents make in the context of open 
access statutes (the right to be free from familial disruption) are not the kind of 
assertions that have won privacy protections from the Supreme Court.  Secondly, 
similar to the analysis of birth parent reproductive privacy assertions in the open 
access statute context, familial privacy assertions prove to be too speculative to 
deserve protection. 
The family unit has long been protected from governmental intrusion based on 
the notion that the family is an independent entity.111  This protection from 
governmental intrusion has evolved into privacy protections surrounding basic 
familial decisions such as the choice to get married112 or divorced113 and choices 
surrounding the rearing and education of children.114  The Supreme Court has 
recognized a privacy interest in these decisions because the right to get married, 
divorced, or to have and raise children are all fundamental liberties rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.115  
Familial privacy law evolved out of a case regarding a parent’s right to determine 
the upbringing of her child.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court struck 
down an Oregon law requiring every parent to send his or her child to a public 
school.116  The Court reasoned that such a law violated the liberty of parents to 
                                                                
110See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). 
111Martha Minow, Making All the Difference:  Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law, in 
PRIVACY LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 838, 839 (Richard C. Turkington & Anita L. Allen 
eds., 2002 ).  Minow writes, “Traditional family law embraced a particular notion of family 
autonomy which barred the legal system from invading the private enclave of the family . . . .”  
Id.   
112See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a Virginia law banning 
interracial marriages because it infringed on the fundamental freedom to marry that is 
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
113See supra, note 79.  
114Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
115See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.  See also infra note 135, for a 
discussion of fundamental rights. 
116268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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choose how their children would be raised and educated.117  Pierce also highlighted 
the State’s need to respect and defer to the decision making of parents so that parents 
could prepare their children for citizenship in the manner they found most 
appropriate.118  Thus, in Pierce, the Court established a reluctance to interfere with 
decisions of parents regarding their children, and, on a more broad interpretation, a 
reluctance to interfere with familial decisions in general. 
Nearly a half a century later, and citing Pierce, the Court continued to protect the 
privacy interests parents have in steering the upbringing of their children.119  
Wisconsin v. Yoder involved a Wisconsin law mandating all children to attend school 
until the age of sixteen.120  Several Amish parents were convicted of failing to send 
their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to school as mandated by the law.121  
The Amish parents argued that the law violated their rights as parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children, particularly the religious upbringing of their children.122  
The parents feared that forced attendance at non-Amish schools would endanger 
their salvation and the salvation of their children because the Amish believed 
salvation could only be attained by those who led lives “separate and apart from the 
world and worldly influence.”123  The Court recognized these concerns and, citing 
familial privacy rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, held that 
the Amish families did not have to abide by the compulsory attendance law.124  The 
Court wrote,  
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted 
with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their 
children.  The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children.  This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their 
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.125 
Thus, the Court’s recognition of the important right of Amish parents to be free from 
State interference with their familial traditions and religious beliefs is a modern 
illustration of the familial privacy law set forth in Pierce. 
The right to privacy as it relates to the right to marry provides further valuable 
insight into the court’s recognition of familial privacy.  It was not until the latter 
twentieth century, in Zablocki v. Redhail, that the Supreme Court first recognized 
                                                                
117Id. at 534. 
118Id. at 535. 
119Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).   
120Id. 
121Id. 
122Id. at 209. 
123Id. at 209-10. 
124Id. at 234. 
125Id. at 232. 
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that a right to privacy surrounded the decision of whether to marry.126  At issue in 
that case was a Wisconsin statute requiring a person who had a child but did not live 
with the child to show proof of fulfillment of his child support obligations to a court 
before he could get the court’s permission to marry.127  The Supreme Court struck 
down the statute holding that the decision to marry was protected by the right of 
privacy, and as such, the Wisconsin statute, which interfered with this privacy right, 
was unconstitutional.128  In its reasoning, the Court highlighted the fundamental 
nature of marriage.129  Quoting an earlier decision, the Court said, “Marriage is one 
of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”130  
This strong language illustrates the notion that familial privacy rights only extend to 
those rights that are so fundamental that human existence relies upon them. 
Thus, today, familial privacy rights surround the important decisions inherent in 
family relationships.  Whether regarding a decision to marry or decisions regarding 
the upbringing of children, courts have recognized that the State does not have the 
right to interfere with decisions central to the nature of a family. 
Birth parent familial privacy assertions against open access statutes are flawed, 
however, because they lack a foundation in a fundamental right worthy of privacy 
protections.  Birth parents argue that open access statutes violate their right to 
familial privacy because such statutes give rise to the possibility that the birth 
parent’s family could be disrupted when an adult adoptee accesses his original birth 
and adoption records and seeks out his birth parents.131  When compared to the 
fundamental rights surrounding marriage, divorce, or the having and raising of 
children, which have all been found to be rights essential to human survival and 
existence,132 the right to be free from disruption clearly lacks the weight of 
importance necessary to constitute a fundamental right worthy of familial privacy 
protections.  It definitely would make life more pleasant if one could be assured that 
his life would never be disrupted, but no one has a legal right to live a life free from 
disruption nor is it essential to human existence and survival to live a life free from 
disruption.  Thus, birth parent privacy assertions based on a right to be free from the 
disruption that might occur should an adoptee seek out his birth parents are not 
sufficient to give rise to familial privacy protection, and open access statutes should 
not be undermined on the premise of familial privacy. 
                                                                
126434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
127Id. at 374. 
128Id. at 384-85.  The Court wrote:  
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of 
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family 
relationships.  As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to 
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with 
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in 
our society. 
Id. at 386. 
129Id. at 383. 
130Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
131See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). 
132See supra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.   
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Birth parent claims to familial privacy can be overcome for another reason:  these 
claims are too speculative to be given privacy protection.  Similar to the reasons 
provided in the analysis of reproductive privacy above,133 birth parents should not be 
granted familial privacy protection on the basis of potential “harms” that may not 
even occur.  The existence of open access statutes will not necessarily give rise to the 
disruption of birth parent lives.  Access to original birth and adoption records may be 
enough for many adult adoptees; they will not have to seek out their birth parents in 
their search for identity.  Furthermore, there are mechanisms that can be put in place 
to mitigate a birth parent’s life from being disrupted, such as Tennessee’s contact 
veto system,134 which will be discussed below.  For all the reasons outlined above,135 
adult adoptee access to their original birth and adoption records should not be 
prohibited based on unfounded birth parent claims to familial privacy. 
B.  Open Access Statutes Do Not Violate Birth Parent Informational Privacy Rights 
The second prong of constitutional privacy encompasses a person’s right to 
determine if, when, and the terms upon which personal information will be 
disclosed.136 Birth parents argue that open access statutes violate their right to 
informational privacy because the statutes allow adult adoptees to gain access to 
birth parent personal information, including the birth parent’s identity and the fact 
                                                                
133See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
134See infra Part VI for a discussion of the Tennessee contact veto system.   
135In addition to the preceding arguments, birth parent claims to privacy in the open access 
statute context can also be undermined on the more general premise that adoption is not a 
fundamental right; and, therefore, adoption issues are not afforded privacy protections.  To 
reiterate, it is generally accepted that privacy protections are afforded only to matters affecting 
fundamental rights. GLENN, supra note 54, at 216.  The Supreme Court has explained that 
fundamental rights are “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscious of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US. 97, 105 (1934).  In 
other words, fundamental rights were not created by statute, they were created by tradition and 
by the notion of what is most highly valued in our society.  Government activities infringing 
on fundamental rights are met with the highest level of scrutiny by the courts and measured 
against their necessity in accomplishing compelling governmental interests. Richard C. 
Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article:  The Emerging Unencumbered 
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 11 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 479, 503 (1990).   
Adoption, however, is a statutory creation.  See supra Part II.B:  A Historical Overview of 
Open Access Statutes, for a discussion of the statutory nature of adoption. Every state has had 
to create statutes in order for adoption to be recognized as a legal activity in that state.  See 
Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute Webpage, http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/ 
Table_Adoption.htm (last visited July 15, 2007) for links to each state’s adoption statutes.  
Adoption, then, cannot be considered a fundamental right and cannot be considered worthy of 
privacy protections.  If adoption rights are statutory, and thus, are not the kinds of rights that 
have associated privacy protections, birth parents cannot claim that adult adoptee access to 
original birth and adoption records violates a birth parent’s right to privacy.  See Does 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7 v. Oregon, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. 2000); see also infra Part V.B.  Thus, birth parent 
privacy is an insufficient basis for the prohibition of adult adoptee access to their original birth 
and adoption records. 
136Madeline Schachter, Access to Information, in INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL 
PRIVACY 199, 199 (2003). 
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that the birth parent had a child and gave it up for adoption, and such access 
constitutes an unjustified disclosure of personal information by the state.137    Birth 
parent claims to informational privacy are undermined in the open-access-statute 
context because government has an important interest at stake in allowing adult 
adoptees to gain access to their original birth and adoption records and can facilitate 
access in a responsible fashion; therefore, informational privacy should not be 
accepted as a basis for the continued rejection of open access statutes. 
To make the assertion that birth parent claims to informational privacy are 
unfounded, one must first have an understanding of informational privacy.  
Informational privacy is one of the more recently recognized categories of privacy; 
the Supreme Court did not formally recognize it until 1977 in Whalen v. Roe.138  
Since Whalen, informational privacy been recognized as including both freedom 
from government disclosure of one’s intimate affairs,139 and protection from 
governmental surveillance of highly personal matters.140  Put more succinctly, 
Richard Turkington141 wrote, “The right to informational privacy entails a claim that 
someone has acquired or disseminated personal or intimate information about you 
without your consent.”142  Informational privacy protections, however, do not extend 
to all disclosures of personal information because no all-encompassing right to the 
nondisclosure of personal information exists.143  Thus, determining whether a 
person’s right to informational privacy has been violated requires a two-step 
analysis.144  First, courts look at the nature of the information that was disclosed to 
determine whether it was of an intimate or personal nature; second, courts then 
determine whether the government’s disclosure of the information was justified.145 
The crux of the debate over what constitutes a violation of a person’s right to 
informational privacy seems to revolve more around the second prong of the analysis 
because even if the government has disclosed intimate information, it still may have 
been justified in doing so.  In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit laid out a set of factors that 
should be considered in deciding whether the government’s disclosure of personal 
                                                                
137See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). 
138
 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
139Madeline Schachter, The Informational Privacy Right,  in INFORMATIONAL AND 
DECISIONAL PRIVACY 288, 288 (2003). 
140Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.24.   
141Mr. Turkington is now deceased, but before his death in 2004 he taught at the Villanova 
University School of Law for twenty-seven years.  He specialized in privacy law.  His 
biography can be found at http://old.law.villanova.edu/facultyandstaff/facultyprofiles/faculty/ 
turkington/tribute. asp (last visited June 16, 2007).   
142Turkington, supra note 135, at 488.   
143GLENN, supra note 54, at 208. 
144See generally Turkington, supra note 135, at 505-510 (1990). 
145Id. 
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information was justified or whether it violated a person’s right to privacy.146  The 
court analyzed the following factors to make the determination:   
[1] [T]he type of record requested, [2] the information it does or might 
contain, [3] the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, [4] the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the 
record was generated, [5] the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure, [6] the degree of the need for access, [7] and 
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated in public policy, 
or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.147 
Thus, it seems from Westinghouse, the Court, in seeking to protect informational 
privacy rights, is going to look to see whether there is a sufficient public interest at 
stake and whether access, once it is granted to one person or entity, can be 
controlled.  Birth parent objections to open access statutes on the basis of the right to 
informational privacy must, then, be assessed against the government’s interest in 
allowing adult adoptees to have access to their original birth and adoption records 
and the government’s effort in preventing too many people, or the wrong people, 
from gaining access to the birth parents’ personal information.   
As discussed above, adoptees tend to struggle with identity formation issues that 
affect their lives greatly and lead to a greater chance of the need for psychological 
care.148  It is surely within the government’s interest to adopt public policy initiatives 
that would aid in increasing the mental health of its citizens.  After all, the 
government constantly makes public policy decisions and engages in activities to 
promote and support other aspects of individuals’ health and well-being.  For 
example, government welfare programs such as Medicaid seek to ensure that all 
citizens will have at least a modicum of access to medical care to protect basic 
physical and mental health needs.  Additionally, state funding of public schools 
illustrates the government’s commitment to education and the fostering of 
resourceful citizens who will, hopefully, make positive choices for themselves and 
society in the future.   
Allowing adult adoptees to have access to their original birth and adoption 
records is a simple and direct mechanism within a greater public policy scheme to 
promote the well-being of individuals that the government can undertake to enable 
                                                                
146United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3rd Cir. 1980).  
In Westinghouse, the court had to decide whether Westinghouse’s release of 
employee medical information to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) constituted a violation of the employees’ right to privacy, or, 
whether the public health interest at stake outweighed the employees’ privacy 
interests.  Id. at 570.  In the end, the court decided that the public health interest was 
substantial so as to legitimize the release of the information; however, NIOSH had 
to give the employees notice of the disclosure and employees were permitted to 
contest the disclosure of their own personal information.  Id. at 581. 
147Id. at 578.  Turkington describes these factors as “a flexible weighing of interests.”  
Turkington, supra note 135, at 509 (1990).   
148See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mental health 
issues that adoptees often face as a result of their inability to access information that would aid 
in the process of identity formation. 
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adoptees and the people they affect, a large sector of society,149 to achieve greater 
mental health and a more fulfilling life.150  And granting adult adoptees access to 
their original birth and adoption records need not come at the expense of the birth 
parents’ psychological health.  Research has shown that greater openness within the 
adoption process may alleviate mental health issues arising from a secretive 
adoption.151 Psychologists Wiley and Baden write that research suggests “[t]he 
movement toward openness [in the adoption process] . . . may actually decrease the 
emergence of negative symptoms for birth parents.”152 
Furthermore, open access statutes demonstrate that the government can further an 
important societal interest while ensuring that birth parent personal information is 
not unnecessarily or excessively disclosed.  A responsible and sufficient open access 
statute system is one in which only adult adoptees, not the public at large, are able to 
access their original birth and adoption records.  Under a system such as this, adult 
adoptees are able to gain the information that they desperately need in order to live 
more fulfilled lives, and the government is able to limit the dissemination of birth 
parent personal information to the only person who is most directly and intimately 
affected by the information—the adoptee.153  Because the government has a 
legitimate interest in bettering the mental health and well-being of its citizens and 
because the government can do this in a way that severely limits the possibility of 
excessive dissemination of birth parent personal information, open access statute 
systems can overcome birth parent informational privacy assertions. 
 The above discussion demonstrates that open access systems do not result in a 
violation of birth parent privacy rights as they are conceived under the two-prong 
notion of constitutional privacy.  First, open access systems do not interfere with a 
birth parent’s independence in making important decisions concerning fundamental 
rights.  Neither familial nor reproductive decision making is imposed upon by open 
access systems.  Furthermore, because the right to give one’s child up for an 
                                                                
149See supra note 20 and accompanying text.    
150In addition to bettering the mental health of adult adoptees, open access to birth and 
adoption records would also put an end to the continued discrimination against adoptees in 
America.  Because adult adoptees are the only citizens in the United States that are legally 
prohibited from knowing who their birth parents are, open access statutes would give them the 
same rights as non-adopted persons.  Equal treatment of its citizens surely is a legitimate 
governmental interest sufficient to overcome birth parent informational privacy assertions. 
151Wiley & Baden, supra note 21, at 42. 
152Id.   
153It seems clear from the scholarship surrounding the debate over informational privacy 
rights that the primary concern revolves around the way modern advancements in technology 
have made the limited or controlled dissemination of information so difficult.   For example, 
in his essay, Intangible Property:  Privacy, Power, and Information Control, Adam Moore 
shows that he is most concerned with the way that use of the internet and other technologies 
results in individuals leaving “digital footprints” of personal information that can be tracked 
and exploited for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes.  See generally Moore, supra note 
63, at 172-190.  Moore writes, “We will have to be much more careful about what we do and 
say in the future both publicly and privately.  Any information or ideas that we disclose, 
including inventions, recipes, or sensitive personal information, might soon be bouncing 
around cyberspace for anyone to access.”  Id. at 187.   
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adoption is a statutory right and not a fundamental right, birth parents cannot expect 
privacy protections to flow out of the exercise of that right.154  Secondly, open access 
systems can achieve their goal of giving adult adoptees access to their birth and 
adoption records in a responsible and reasonable manner that does not violate birth 
parent informational privacy rights.  Constitutional privacy, while so very important 
to the functioning of a healthy society, should not be stretched and distorted to 
encompass birth parent privacy rights at the expense of open access systems.   
V.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES IN SUPPORT OF ADULT ADOPTEE 
ACCESS TO ORIGINAL BIRTH AND ADOPTION RECORDS 
Birth parent privacy assertions have recently been addressed in the Tennessee 
and Oregon court systems.  These courts looked at birth parent privacy assertions 
from two different perspectives.  One court (the Supreme Court of Tennessee) 
analyzed the assertions against traditional notions of what constitutes familial, 
reproductive, or informational privacy.  The other court (the Oregon Court of 
Appeals) looked at whether statutory rights, such as those surrounding adoption, 
could ever be afforded the privacy protections given to fundamental rights. Neither 
method of analysis led the courts to find validity in birth parent privacy claims 
against open access systems, and thus, these assertions failed. 
A.  Doe v. Sundquist (Tennessee): Open Access Statutes Do Not Violate a Birth 
Parent’s Right to Familial, Reproductive, or Informational Privacy 
In Doe v. Sundquist, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that birth parent privacy 
should not be accepted as a basis for barring adult adoptees’ access to their original 
birth and adoption records because birth parent privacy assertions are too 
speculative, differ too greatly from the kinds of protections traditionally granted 
under the right to privacy, and are not sufficient to overcome society’s interest in 
adoptee access to such information.155  In that case, a group of birth mothers argued 
that a Tennessee law allowing adoptees aged twenty-one years or older to access 
their sealed adoption records violated birth parent privacy under the Tennessee 
Constitution.156 Tennessee’s Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff birth mothers’ 
privacy claims on several grounds.157   
In responding to the plaintiffs’ claims that the law violated their rights to 
procreational, familial, and informational privacy, the court acknowledged that such 
rights are recognized under both the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions.158  The 
                                                                
154See supra note 135. 
155Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 1999). 
156Id. at 920-21.  Pertman gives some insight into the history behind the Tennessee law: 
“politicians were extremely skeptical when an adoptee named Caprice East began lobbying 
them to unseal records.  But on March 18, 1995, the state Senate approved the legislation 
thirty to two.  The House followed suit, ninety-nine to zero, after which the lawmakers gave 
Caprice a standing ovation.  PERTMAN, supra note 13, at 82. 
157Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d at 920. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee upheld the law against the birth parents’ attack that it “impair[ed] the vested rights 
of birth parents who surrendered children under [a prior adoption] law.”  Id. at 921.    
158Id. at 926.   
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court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims “that disclosure of adoption records invades the 
rights to familial privacy by . . . disrupting both biological and adoptive families by 
releasing identifying information previously sealed.”159  The court held that birth 
parents’ rights to familial privacy were not invaded for two primary reasons.  First, 
the court held that the plaintiffs’ fears of familial disruption were too speculative 
because such disruption “may or may not occur a minimum of 21 years after the 
adoption occurs.”160  In addition, the court reminded the plaintiffs that traditional 
conceptions of familial privacy seek to protect a person’s choice to get married or 
have and raise children, not to protect a family from disruption that may or may not 
even occur.161 
Addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that the open access statute violated the birth 
parents’ right to reproductive privacy, the court emphasized the purpose of adoption 
rights and posited that the plaintiffs’ argument for reproductive privacy was 
misdirected.162  The court stated that “[Adoption] was created to protect the interests 
of children whose parents are unable or unwilling to provide for their care . . . and 
not to advance a procreational right to privacy of the biological parent.”163  The court 
continued, “Although the prospect of having the records of the adoption released to 
the child 21 years later may have some bearing on the decision, it is far too 
speculative to conclude that it interferes with the right to procreational privacy.”164 
The Sundquist court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments against the open 
access statute by holding that the statute did not violate the birth parents’ right to 
informational privacy.165  The court decided that birth parents lacked a fundamental 
right not to have personal information released to their biological children.166  In 
making this argument, the court cited several Sixth Circuit cases rejecting the 
assertion of a “constitutional right to the non-disclosure of personal information.”167  
                                                                
159Id.  
160Id.  
161Id. 
162Id. 
163Id. (citation omitted). 
164Id. 
165Id. 
166Id.  The Tennessee Supreme Court wrote, “Absent a fundamental right or other 
compelling reason, we reject the invitation to extend constitutional protection to the non-
disclosure of personal information.”  Id.   
167Id. at n.7.  The Tennessee Supreme Court cited Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 
(6th Cir. 1995).  The Jarvis court held that the unauthorized release of medical records does 
not violate a constitutionally protected right to privacy because the release of medical records 
does not concern a fundamental right.  Id.  Quoting its conclusion in an earlier case, the Jarvis 
court wrote, “the Constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private 
information.”  Id.  Similarly, in another Sixth Circuit case, the court held that an inmate’s right 
to privacy was not violated when a prison official was able to peruse the inmate’s medical 
records and find out that the inmate was HIV positive.   Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 
(6th Cir. 1994).  The court, quoting itself from an earlier case said that “recognition of a 
constitutional right of nondisclosure would force courts to ‘balance almost every act of 
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The court asserted that a birth parent cannot claim informational privacy protection 
because if there is no constitutional guarantee to the non-disclosure of personal 
information,168 then a birth parent cannot have an expectation that her personal 
information will never be disclosed to her children.    
In sum, the Supreme Court of Tennessee raised the bar of privacy rights analysis 
in the adoption context.  The court went beyond traditional arguments that birth 
parents have a general right to be left alone169 and examined specific birth parent 
familial, reproductive, and informational privacy rights assertions.170  The court’s 
finding that birth parent claims to familial, reproductive, and informational privacy 
claims all lacked a sufficient basis to receive privacy protection shows that birth 
parents should not be able to couch their assertions that adoptees should be denied 
access to their original birth and adoption records in a right to privacy argument.  
Thus, adult adoptees should have access to their original birth and adoption records 
because allowing access will not violate birth parent privacy claims.   
B.  Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 v. Oregon (Oregon):  The Statutory Nature of 
Adoption Further Undermines Birth Parents’ Privacy Claims 
In 2000, several Oregon birth mothers who had placed their children for adoption 
between 1960 and 1994 challenged a voter-enacted initiative entitled Measure 58.171  
Measure 58 gave adult adoptees in Oregon a procedural mechanism to access their 
original birth records without requiring the adoptees to show good cause.172  The 
birth mothers argued that Measure 58 violated their constitutionally protected 
fundamental right to reproductive privacy “because it constitutes an unwanted 
governmental intrusion into their decisions concerning whether to bear or beget 
children . . . the decision to surrender [a child] for adoption should be protected to 
the same extent as a decision to have an abortion or to give birth to . . . and raise the 
child.”173   
Instead of pointing to the speculative nature of this reproductive privacy 
argument as the court in Sundquist did,174 the Oregon Court of Appeals attacked the 
argument by holding that the statutory nature of adoption segregates adoption rights 
                                                          
government, both state and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable, 
and all-encompassing as individual privacy.’” Id. at 740.            
168Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d at 926.  
169See In re Roger B., 418 N.E. 2d 751 (Ill. 1981). 
170Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919. 
171Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 v. Oregon, 993 P.2d 822, 822 (Or. 2000).  
172The Court of Appeals of Oregon wrote:   
Measure 58 provides:  “Upon request of a written application to the state registrar, any 
adopted person 21 years of age or older born in the state of Oregon shall be issued a 
certified copy of his/her unaltered, original and unamended certificate of birth in the 
custody of the state registrar . . . . Contains no exceptions.” 
Id. at 826.   
173Id. at 835 (citation omitted).   
174Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d at 926. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/7
2007] THE ONLY AMERICANS LEGALLY PROHIBITIED 457 
from privacy protections enjoyed by fundamental (non-statutory) rights.175  The 
Oregon court asserted, “Statutes do not create fundamental rights”176 and concluded 
that since adoption is a statutory creation, rights surrounding adoption cannot be 
afforded fundamental status or their associated privacy protections.177  The court 
summarized its holding that Measure 58 does not violate the privacy rights of birth 
mothers by stating, “Because a birth mother has no fundamental right to have her 
child adopted, she can also have no correlative fundamental right to have her child 
adopted under circumstances that guarantee her identity will not be revealed to the 
child.”178    
In making privacy arguments in the adoption context, birth parents assume that 
the rights associated with the adoption process give them the right to be left alone in 
making the decisions to give a child up for adoption and to remain anonymous to the 
child.  As the Oregon case shows, however, if all the rights associated with adoption 
are created by statute and are not fundamental,179 and only fundamental rights are 
afforded privacy protections,180 then adoption rights do not afford privacy 
protections.  In the absence of statutorily created privacy rights, a birth parent is left 
without any claim to privacy protection in the adoption context.  Thus, the statutory 
nature of adoption undermines birth parents’ privacy assertions.  Adult adoptees 
should not be barred from accessing their original birth records based on birth parent 
privacy claims inappropriately asserted against statutory rights that lack the 
fundamental status necessary for guaranteed privacy protections. 
                                                                
175Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 993 P.2d at 836. 
176Id. at 835 n.8.   
177Id. at 836.  In bolstering its argument that adoption rights are not fundamental rights, 
and thus, should not be protected by the right to privacy, the court illustrated some differences 
between a choice to give a child up for adoption and a choice to use contraception or to abort a 
child.  The court wrote:  
A decision to prevent a pregnancy, or to terminate a pregnancy in an early stage, is a 
decision that may be made unilaterally by individuals seeking to prevent conception or 
by a woman who wishes to terminate a pregnancy.  A decision to relinquish a child for 
adoption, however, is not a decision that may be made unilaterally by a birth mother or 
by any other party.  It requires, at a minimum, a willing birth mother, a willing 
adoptive parent, and the active oversight and approval of the state.  Given that reality, 
it cannot be said that a birth mother has a fundamental right to give birth to a child and 
then have someone else assume legal responsibility for that child . . . . Although 
adoption is an option that generally is available to women faced with the dilemma of 
an unwanted pregnancy, we conclude that it is not a fundamental right.   
Id. at 836 (citation omitted).  
178Id.  The court also stated its opinion that a law allowing adult adoptees to access their 
birth parent identifying information would not have “the same sort of constitutional infirmities 
as the laws that criminalized contraception and abortion that were struck down in Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, and Roe.”  Id. at 835-36. 
179These contentions were asserted in Part II.B of this Note; see supra notes 41-45 and 
accompanying text, and see supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text for the discussion of 
the Oregon case law. 
180See supra note 135. 
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The Tennessee and Oregon cases illustrate how two states, and their legislative 
and judicial systems, have been able to assess birth parent privacy claims in ways 
that are not dismissive or trivializing, but rather, true to the manner in which privacy 
has been interpreted and protected throughout history.  In finding that birth parent 
privacy claims do not constitute what has traditionally been considered worthy of 
familial, reproductive, or informational privacy, and finding that adoption rights, as 
statutory creations, should not be afforded the privacy protections only given to 
fundamental rights, these courts have sought to balance the rights of both parties 
within the confines of traditional privacy law.  As the next section illustrates, the 
balancing of the interests of birth parents and adult adoptees is perhaps best 
accomplished through a novel legislative approach.   
VI.  A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
While adult adoptees should not be denied access to their original birth and 
adoption records on the basis of birth parent privacy, some negative effects could 
result from such access, and the negative effects could undermine the integrity of the 
adoption process.181  For example, an adult adoptee, after obtaining the name of his 
birth mother, could seek her out and face the reality that she does not want to have 
contact with him.  This could be emotionally devastating for the adoptee and 
seriously disrupt the life of the birth mother.  Many might argue that no one benefits 
from a system that could give rise to these circumstances.  There are, however, 
mechanisms that can be put into place that, while protecting the interests of all 
parties, are not premised on a superior privacy right of birth parents. 
Tennessee has attempted to mitigate these risks by giving birth parents the option 
of establishing a contact veto.182  Under this system, a birth parent who does not wish 
to be contacted by her biological child can register a contact veto with the state.  If 
that child accesses his original birth records, he will be notified of his biological 
parent’s unwillingness to be contacted.183  Should the adoptee violate the contact 
                                                                
181Some argue that open access statutes will inhibit people from giving their child up for 
adoption and increase abortion rates.  Statement of Marley Elizabeth Greiner, Executive Chair, 
Bastard Nation: The Adoption Rights Organization, Written Testimony in Support of SB 355:  
Hearing on Open Records for Adult Adoptees Before the NH H. Children and Family Law 
Comm. (Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://www.bastards.org/activism/local/nh/nh-sb335-
marley-testimony.htm.  Greiner opposes this argument.  Id. 
182TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-128 (2006). The language of the statute is as follows:  
(a) The department shall establish and maintain a contact veto registry for the purpose 
of permitting registration of the willingness or unwillingness of the persons or classes 
of persons named herein for contact with persons eligible to have access to any 
records covered by this part . . . . (b) The following persons may have their names 
entered in the registry either to file a contact veto or to give consent to contact: (1) A 
parent, sibling, spouse, lineal ancestor, or lineal descendant of an adopted person or a 
person for whom records are maintained . . . either before or after such persons reach 
twenty-one (21) years of age. (2) The legal representative of any person described in 
subdivision (b)(1). 
Id. 
183TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-128(a) (2006).  Before an adult adoptee can gain access to his 
original birth and adoption records in Tennessee, he must complete and sign a sworn statement 
that: he is aware of the contact veto registry, he will not attempt to contact his birth parent if 
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veto, he would be guilty of a misdemeanor and face the possibility of civil suit and 
the payment of damages.184  The contact veto addresses the needs of birth parents 
because it literally makes it illegal for an adult adoptee to contact his birth parent if 
the birth parent has filed a veto with the state.  This puts the control of making 
contact into the hands of the birth parent, empowering her to allow or deny contact.  
Notice, however, that it simultaneously empowers adult adoptees to gather pertinent 
information about their origins.     
A proponent of the Tennessee system has noted that the contact veto 
“establish[es] a presumption of openness” in the Tennessee adoption system 
(because an adoptee can seek out his birth parent unless the birth parent has filed a 
veto) and argues that Tennessee’s contact veto system should be the model for a 
standardized open records system in which adult adoptees would have unrestricted 
access to their original birth and adoption records.185  Through this system, 
Tennessee has sought to maintain the integrity of the adoption process while, at the 
same time, eschewing the secrecy and stigmas attached to adoption through the years 
by proposing that openness will be the rule, not the exception.186   If openness is the 
rule, this proponent argues, then the era where birth parents’ privacy interests are so 
much more heavily weighted than adult adoptees’ right to access will end.187 
                                                          
the birth parent has filed a contact veto, and  he understands the legal implications of a 
violation of a contact veto.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127(f) (2006).   
184TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-132 (2006).  Under this statutory section, a birth parent that 
has been contacted by her biological child despite the birth parent’s registry of a contact veto 
has a cause of action against the child.  Id.  The child’s act of contacting the parent despite the 
contact veto is classified as a Class B misdemeanor under Tennessee law.  TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-1-132(g) (2006).  The biological parent could receive injunctive relief, compensatory and 
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and proceedings costs if successful in the cause of 
action.  TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-132(a), (d) (2006).  Note, at the time of this writing, there 
were no reported cases of birth parent suits in Tennessee against a biological child for 
damages resulting from a violation of a contact veto.  It should also be noted that one author 
believes that codification of mechanisms such as Tennessee’s contact veto are unjust.  
PERTMAN, supra note 13, at 80.  Referring to “search and consent” mechanisms, Pertman 
writes, “While it may sound reasonable to prevent communications unless both sides agree to 
it first, enshrining the prohibition in law is ludicrous.  No other adults in America are treated 
in this way, and singling out adoptees marks them as lesser citizens entitled to fewer rights.”  
Id. 
185Fleming, supra note 41, at 478.  Fleming writes:  
States should adopt a contact veto system similar to Tennessee’s.  The contact veto 
allows all adult adoptees to gain access to the identifying information contained in 
their adoption records, while honoring the wishes of those birth parents who do not  
want to make any connection with the children they surrendered.  This system 
addresses the concerns of individual birth parents while maintaining and facilitating 
access for the large majority of birth parents and adoptees who desire openness and 
contact.   
Id.   
186Id.  
187Id. at 478-79.  It is important to note here that there are vehement critics of the 
Tennessee contact veto system.  Bastard Nation, a group dedicated to advancing adoptee rights 
argues that contact vetoes, such as the one in Tennessee, “are a violation of an adoptee's right 
to due process and equal protection under the law.” Conditional Access Litigation and Other 
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Through the use of the contact veto, Tennessee has recognized adult adoptees’ right 
and need to know their biological origins and gives birth parents, should they so 
desire, the chance to deny contact and leave the circumstances of their past in the 
past.188   
                                                          
Legislative Compromises, www.bastards.org/documents/conditional.html (last visited 
February 9, 2007). The group continues:  
Conditional access legislation in the form of the "contact veto" implies that adoptees 
and birthparents are not capable of handling adult contact. If either party in an 
adoption does not wish contact, they can simply say no, as in any other adult situation. 
If they feel they are being unduly harassed, they can use the same remedies at their 
disposal as other citizens. Traditional no-contact orders and orders of protection are 
issued via court order after a person has demonstrated a pattern of threatening or 
abusive behavior. Even then, the person who has the order issued against him has the 
right to answer and face his accuser in a court of law. Contact vetoes, however, are 
issued based solely on the adoptive status of an individual, and are without recourse. 
In open records states where no contact veto exists, such as Kansas and Alaska, there 
are no reports of incidents that would demonstrate a necessity for special protections 
of the birth family. 
Id.   
188There are several other mechanisms that have either been put into place in some states 
or have been discussed as a possible solution to the issue of adult adoptee access to original 
birth and adoption records.  For example, several states have experimented with registries 
where interested parties can put their name into a registry if they are interested in gaining 
access to their original records or if they are interested in contacting a biological relative.  
PERTMAN, supra note 13, at 44.   As Pertman explains:  
[I]n a “search and consent” state, an adoption agency or a court-appointed 
intermediary usually looks for the birth parents and, with their approval, either gives 
the adoptee the requested data or facilitates a reunion.  In states with “mutual consent” 
registries, people can list their names at a central location; if both the seeker and the 
person being sought enroll, then the desired records are released. 
Id.  The problem with these registries, however, is that they perpetuate the notion that birth 
parents have a superior right to privacy that must be protected even at the expense of adult 
persons who simply wish to know more about their own backgrounds.  For example, in the 
case of “search and consent” registries, the birth parents must give their approval before an 
adoptee is able to access the requested data.  If, as this Note has argued, birth parent claims to 
privacy rights are unfounded in the adoption-record-access context, then these registry 
systems, which place birth parent privacy above adult adoptee rights, are an unacceptable 
solution.  In addition, there is a general feeling among the adult adoptee activist community 
that these registries are not only legally improper, but that they are unreliable and inadequate.  
Pertman writes that registries are “obscure and inconsistent.”  Id.  The Executive Committee 
of Bastard Nation, in a letter to the United States House of Representatives Ways and Means 
Committee regarding a pending national adoption reunion registry bill wrote:  
We believe that the formation of a reunion registry might be appropriate if adoptees 
were already able to obtain their original birth certificates in the same manner as the 
rest of the American population. But reunion registries are not substitutes for righting 
the wrong of sealed records, and the issue of opening sealed records should not be 
confused with search and reunion. Access to one's birth document is nothing less than 
a civil right. Measures which aid in reunions do nothing to remedy the violation of this 
right caused by the denial of access. Searching and non-searching adoptees alike want 
and deserve the same rights as all other adult U.S. citizens. 
Bastard Nation Executive Committee, Resolution of the Executive Committee of Bastard 
Nation on a National Voluntary Mutual Consent Registry, June 10, 1998, available at 
http://www.bastards.org/activism/nationalregistry.html.  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
“The right to be let alone”189 is perhaps the most simple and direct way privacy 
has ever been described.  But like many legal doctrines, things tend to become less 
clear and more nuanced as the law evolves.  Now, privacy protections are more 
about keeping government out of the personal decision making of individuals and 
government’s responsible collection and dissemination of personal information.  
These ideas are very important and highly valued by our society, as they should be, 
but they are not at risk in the context of open access statutes for adult adoptees.   
Adult adoptees should not be barred from accessing their original birth and 
adoption records on the basis of faulty birth parent privacy claims. As this note has 
shown, open access statutes do not jeopardize the important reproductive or familial 
decision making of birth parents.  It is simply too speculative to assert that open 
access statutes interfere with birth parent choices.  Furthermore, open access statutes 
do not threaten the kind of rights worthy of privacy protection—fundamental rights.  
Adoption itself is not a fundamental right, so birth parents are also without support in 
their argument that the fact that they gave a child up for adoption entitles them to any 
kind of privacy protection.  Finally, it is clearly within the government’s interest to 
allow adult adoptees to access their original birth and adoption records.  This 
governmental interest, accompanied by the fact that such access can be limited to 
only the adoptee, undermines birth parent claims to informational privacy.   
An open access system is not a zero sum game; there need not be a winner and a 
loser.  The possibility of mechanisms such as Tennessee’s contact veto shows that 
the adult adoptee’s interest in gaining information about his origins and the birth 
parent’s interest in not having her life disrupted can both be respected in an open 
access system.  State legislatures and courts should allow adult adoptees to have 
access to their original birth and adoption records; and perhaps then, adoptees such 
as Carolyn Dixon190 will be able to move a step closer to knowing their origins and 
gain a better understanding of themselves.   
                                                                
189Justice Louis Brandeis said these words in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928). 
190
 See supra Part I:  Introduction 
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